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Government at all levels, industry, military and critical infrastructure, may be at risk due 
to purposeful manipulation of micro-processing chips during the manufacturing process. 
Many microchips intentionally provide remote access to allow for monitoring and 
updating firmware.  However, a remote access capability also introduces a vulnerability, 
which allows others to potentially take control of a system and shut it down remotely, 
spy, or remove data.  If this is in fact occurring, the implications to the national and 
homeland security could be significant. It does not appear that there are currently policies 
and processes to identify purposefully manufactured vulnerable micro processing chips.  
Should it be determined that vulnerabilities do in fact exist, a federal government-led 
effort is needed to identify the entities producing these chips; to assess possible intentions 
of these actors; inventory hardware that is in use, which may have been compromised; 
and, finally, to pursue the development of a remediation strategy.  Additionally, the 
current supply chain process will have to be re-examined to mitigate current and future 
concerns.  Therefore, in 2012, the Government Accounting Office recommended that the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) create and implement a cyber security supply 
chain vulnerability policy.  This policy will assist the federal, state, and local 
governments, as well as private sector entities, to develop guidelines for procurement and 
policy decisions.  
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Pwned: verb, to compromise or control, specifically another computer 
(server or PC), Website, gateway device, or application.1    
Have the federal government, Department of Defense (DoD), state and local 
governments, and private industry and critical infrastructure all been pwned?  That 
possibility and the potential implications will be examined in this thesis.  The federal 
government is the largest single purchaser of technology in the world, spending more 
than $400 billion each year.2 The Office of Federal Procurement policy mission is: To 
ensure that it spends money wisely and eliminates waste and abuse of taxpayer dollars;3 
this includes ensuring the purchase of secure and reliable equipment.  Specifically, the 
DoD spent $33 billion on information technology during FY2012.4 Purchases ranged 
from simple desktop computers to highly classified telecommunications systems.5  Many 
of the hardware devices contain microchips manufactured outside of the United States.6  
In 1986, the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management emphasized 
the need for Department of Defense (DoD) to expand its use of commercial off the shelf 
products (COTS).7   
                                                 
1 “Editor,” Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definitions/pwn 
(accessed October 22, 2012). 
2 Marcia G. Madsen, Louis M. Addeo, Frank J. Anderson, Jr., Dr. Allan V. Burman, Carl DeMaio, 
Marshall J. Doke, Jr., David A. Drabkin, Jonathan L. Etherton, James A. Hughes, Deidre A. Lee, Tom 
Luedtke, Joshua I. Schwartz, and Roger D. Waldron, Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office 
of Federal Procurement Policy and the United States Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget 
Office, 2007). 
3  Whitehouse, Whitehouse, Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal Procurement, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement_mission (accessed October 22, 2012). 
4 Office of Management and Budget, “IT Dashboard,” August 31, 2012, 
http://www.itdashboard.gov/portfolios (accessed October 22, 2012). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Government Accounting Office [GAO], Offshoring: U.S. Semiconductor and Software Industries 
Increasingly Produce in China and India (Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 2006). 
7 President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management [The Packard Commission], A Quest 
for Excellence: Final Report to the President and Appendix, Final (Washington, D.C.: Packard 
Commission, 1986). 
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Historically, the United States (U.S.) has dominated in worldwide manufacturing 
and research with particular strengths in the technology sector. However, due to rising 
manufacturing costs and the emerging global economy, manufactures have found that 
they could reduce costs and increase profitability by identifying locations outside of the 
U.S. to move their manufacturing operations. Some of the locations with the lowest labor 
costs, the most expensive component of the manufacturing process, were in Southeast 
Asia, particularly in China.8  As manufacturers moved their operations to these new 
locations, profit margins rose and a new model for the manufacturing process began.  
More and more companies have continued to move their manufacturing offshore, 
including that for technology and computers.9 This move was not without concern. 
Companies that had transferred their manufacturing process offshore were finding many 
of their products being counterfeited and showing up in the U.S. and the rest of the world.  
This became a booming industry for organizations in these countries. In particular, 
China’s black market became the most the adept at replicating others products.10  
With the electronics and technology sector manufacturing moving off shore, 
several signs began appearing, indicating that there would be a potential problem. The 
first sign was that consumer electronics were being counterfeited. Later, it was found that 
malware was being inserted into some of the electronics. One of the first examples of this 
situation was a digital picture frame that had malware embedded within it.  When the user 
attached the peripheral device to their computer, the malware executed and entered their 
machine.11 In July 2010, Dell preformed a recall on PowerEdge R410 Rack servers due 
to a malware embedded within the systems management software.12  More recently, 
                                                 
8 Mike Vargo, “Innovation in an Offshoring Economy,” CIT Engineering Magazine, winter 2011. 
9 Government Accounting Office, Offshoring.  
10 Sharon LaFraniere, “Facing Counterfeiting Crackdown, Beijing Vendors Fight Back,” New York 
Times, March 1, 2009. 
11 Gregg Keizer, “Best Buy Sold Infected Digital Picture Frames,” Computerworld Online, January 
23, 2008. 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9058638/Best_Buy_sold_infected_digital_picture_frames 
(accessed October 10, 2012). 
12 John Oates, “Dell Warns on Spyware Infected Server Motherboards,” The Register Online, July 21, 
2010, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/07/21/dell_server_warning/ (accessed September 20, 2012).  
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researchers discovered malicious code developed by Chinese hackers for smart cards 
targeting Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DoD, and State Department 
personnel.13   
Smart cards are a secondary authentication measure between passwords and the 
computer.  After entering your password you, swipe the card to validate your identity. 
Once you swiped the card on an infected machine the malware in the computer steals the 
smartcard authentication information and pin allowing the hackers to authenticate and 
gain access to the networks whenever they want.14 While there have been no confirmed 
unclassified reports of a compromised microchip,15 there have been several instances of 
counterfeit microchips entering the supply chain. The most significant was two men from 
Texas who had sold the DoD, Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Energy, 
numerous universities and defense contractors computer equipment that was purported to 
be authentic when in reality was counterfeit.16  While no official governmental reports 
have come out and acknowledged the issue, there have been some hints at the possibility 
by personnel testifying before Congress and in policy documents.17  Some security 
observers are concerned that the nation is vulnerable to an emerging threat emanating 
from purposefully manufactured vulnerabilities in off the shelf microchips.  
 
  
                                                 
13 Kelly Jackson Higgins, “Sykipot Malware Now Steals Smart-Card Credentials,” Information Week 
Online, January 12, 2012, http://www.darkreading.com/authentication/167901072/security/attacks-
breaches/232400288/sykipot-malware-now-steals-smart-card-credentials.html (accessed October 22, 2012). 
14 Ibid. 
15 For purposes of this paper, a compromised microchip is defined as integrated circuit in which 
security cannot be trusted. 
16 Glenn Derene and Joe Pappalardo, “Counterfeit Chips Raise Big Hacking, Terror Threats, Experts 
Say,” Popular Mechanics Online, October 2009, 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/news/4253628 (accessed July 10, 2012). 
17 White House, Cyber Space Policy Review (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2009). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
A systematic literature review was conducted to assess the available information 
on the topic of cyber security and hardware compromise.  The literature provides what is 
known about the topic, what is unknown, and what should be known.   
Cyber attacks generally refer to criminal activity conducted via the Internet. These 
attacks can include stealing an organization’s intellectual property, confiscating online 
bank accounts, creating and distributing viruses on other computers, posting confidential 
business information on the Internet, and disrupting a country’s critical national 
infrastructure. Literature derived from government reports, peer-reviewed articles, and 
books establish the basis of the review of cyber security.  
Of particular interest is hardware compromise.  There has been much speculation 
about the potential of the microchip supply chain being vulnerable to manipulation.  This 
can occur via counterfeit products or with the actual fabrication of microchip that 
contains a built in backdoor or kill switch.  Have the security implications of hardware 
been considered?  If the actual hardware infrastructure that the services ride on is 
compromised then all processes that follow, no matter what precautions are taken, will be 
at risk as well.   
The literature review involved three main steps. The first step was to identify 
keywords for use in the on-line search process (Table 1).  The search topics were 
intentionally broad to capture a variety of information on this topic.  Secondly, a 
systematic review of search engines (Google, Google Scholar) and graduate school on-
line libraries (Dudley Knox) was performed on the key word list.  After relevant sources 





Table 1.   Keywords Used in Guiding the Systematic Literature Review 
Keyword List 
Generic Hardware compromise; Cyber security; Microchip 
compromise; Counterfeit microchip; Microchip backdoor 














Current information was sought from January 2009 forward from a variety of 
sources including: government and non-government information, journals, books, media, 
databases, and online articles.  In addition, both peer reviewed and non-peer reviewed 
literature were considered.  This review was intended to identify resources that would aid 
in understanding microchip fabrication, cyber security, counterfeit microchips, and how 
microchips can introduce vulnerabilities in homeland security. 
More than 20 sources have been identified.  Some have been analyzed for their 
relevance to the study of cloud computer hardware compromise and cyber security; this is 
an ongoing process. Sources that addressed cyber security in general, but did not 
specifically address the hardware or microchips, were considered for their application to 
the broader topic.  For example, it is important to understand the methods of cyber 
security before looking deeper into hardware vulnerabilities.   
The literature review revealed a significant amount of information on the 
hypothetical possibility of a manufactured vulnerability but not much in documented 
cases.  These sources included government databases, peer reviewed journal articles, 
books written by experts, and articles from those studying terrorism inside and outside of 
government.   
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A. HARDWARE VULNERABILITIES 
The first consideration is whether computer hardware, more specifically, whether 
microchips are vulnerable to being hacked or compromised during manufacture.  In order 
to address this, a comprehensive examination of the process would have to be conducted. 
Key to this would be the design process as well as the manufacturing process. The 
security and quality control validation at both points, with an emphasis on the facilities, is 
critical.  
Of specific concern would be the quality of hardware being used, specifically, 
whether it was an original or a counterfeit.  There have been numerous instances of the 
sale of counterfeit computer microchips to the Department of Defense.18 This has the 
potential for corrupting many critical systems.  Also in the same DoD report, supply 
concerns are of significance because “it opens the possibility that Trojan Horses and 
other unauthorized design inclusions may appear….”19   
According to Sally Adee in “The Hunt for the Kill Switch,” another vulnerability 
that has the potential for impacting homeland security is the dependence on foreign 
suppliers.  In this instance, all manufacturers, with the exception of one IBM plant, are 
outside of the United States, and the majority in South East Asia.20  Should an issue arise 
within one of these countries that is a major fabricator, adverse impacts could be felt 
through the lack of supply.  This could either be intentional, such as a political measure, 
or unintentional, such as an accident or act of god.  
A serious concern would be the inability to share secure communications, either 
voice or data.  The implication of this would be catastrophic if, during a conflict, the 
adversary had the ability to monitor any information sent via a computer system.  
Another would be the ability to shut down a critical system remotely.  The impact of this 
could be enormous if flight control systems, weapons systems, or other critical 
infrastructure were shut down.  The DoD Task Force on High Performance Microchip 
                                                 
18 Defense Science Board, High Performance Microchip Supply (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Defense, 2005). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Sally Adee, “The Hunt for the Kill Switch,” Spectrum, IEEE 45, no. 5 (2008). 
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Supply stated, “If real and potential adversaries ability to subvert the US microelectronics 
components is not reversed or technically mitigated, our adversaries will gain enormous 
asymmetric advantages that could possibly put the US force projection at risk”21  
There have been numerous papers written about the potential for microchip 
compromise and the impact it could have on various facets of government and industry.  
The University of Illinois Computer Science Department sought to prove that it is 
possible to implant an undetectable vulnerability on a microchip.  They then did it and 
provided the compromised chip along with uncompromised chips to researchers to see if 
they could determine which one was the compromised chip.  This was done utilizing 
current technology.  The researchers were not successful in finding the vulnerability, so 
the university was able to prove their point that it can be done.22  The concern is 
significant enough to warrant DARPA and IARPA to begin initiatives to identify 
potential microchip vulnerabilities.23  Currently, the process of identification of 
compromised microchips is very difficult and time consuming, requiring destructive 
testing and reverse engineering.  Even in doing so, the correct identification of a potential 
vulnerability is not a sure thing.   
Only recently are governmental agencies looking seriously at the possibility of 
microchip vulnerability.  The reason they have not thus far, according to Carl McCants, 
Program Manager at DARPA, is because there have been no documented instances that a 
microchip has been compromised.24  He went on to say there has been speculation and 
instances of malware being inserted on a platform, but there are no attributions of this 
having occurred.25   
                                                 
21 Defense Science Board, High Performance Microchip Supply. 
22 Joseph Tucek, Anthony Cozzie, Chris Grier, Weihang Jiang, Yuanyuan Zhou, and Samuel T. King, 
Designing and Implementing Malicious Hardware (Urbana, IL: USENIX Association, 2008). 
23 Federal Business Opportunities, “DARPA,” 
https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=406db188e0e1935a806c143a5603eb48&tab=core&
_cview=0 (accessed January 28, 2012).  
24 Carl McCants (DARPA Program Manager), interview with author, February 15, 2012. 
25Ibid. 
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In July 2010, Dell recalled its PowerEdge R410 Rack servers due to a malware 
embedded within the systems management software.26  More recently, researchers 
discovered malicious code developed by Chinese hackers on smart cards targeting DHS, 
DoD, and State Department personnel.  Smart cards are a secondary authentication 
measure between passwords and the computer.   
According to Sergei Skorobogatov of Cambridge University, the threat does exist, 
in fact.27  He has recently developed a non-invasive/non destructive testing process for 
microchips.  Cambridge University is the first research institution that has successfully 
tested off the shelf DoD field programmable gate array (FPGA) chips in use today and 
found a preprogrammed backdoor in the hardware of the microchip itself.  The 
implications of this finding are very significant.  This raises serious questions about the 
integrity of the manufacturers and their respective security practices.  As a result of these 
findings, decisions will have to be made as how to remediate what is already in 
production and how security is enforced in future production.28         
B. CYBER SECURITY 
Attacks on computer systems can range from disruption of critical infrastructure 
to financial gain, and they are relatively new for the world of criminal investigations. The 
definition of cybercrime is criminal activity done using computers and the Internet.29  
The scope is very broad and growing more so each day as more illegal computer 
activities are being done and identified. 
During the month of August, there were 30 documented serious incidents of 
hacktivism.  Hacktivism is defined as the use of computers and computer networks as a 
means of protest to promote political ends.30  Some of the tools that are used include 
                                                 
26 John Oates, “Biting the Hand that Feed IT,” The Register, July 21, 2010. 
27 Sergei Skorobogatov and Christopher Woods, Breakthrough Silicon Scanning Discovers Backdoor 
in Military Chip (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University, 2011). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Techterms Computer Dictionary, s.v. “cybercrimes,” 
http://www.techterms.com/definition/cybercrime (accessed September 22, 2011). 
30 Alexandra Samuel, “Hacktivism and the Future of Political Participation,” August 2004, 
http://www.alexandrasamuel.com/dissertation/index.html (accessed July 15, 2012).  
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Website defacements and redirects, denial-of-service attacks, information theft, Website 
parodies, and virtual sabotage, all of which are crimes that can be investigated and 
prosecuted.   
Cyber criminals are increasingly adept at gaining undetected access to IT systems.  
They keep a low profile and are capable of maintaining a long-term presence in IT 
environments.  Organizations seem to focus heavily on antivirus and blocking 
pornography, while potential cybercrimes may be going on undetected and unaddressed.  
They may be leaving themselves vulnerable to cybercrime based on a false sense of 
security, perhaps even complacency, driven by the use of these security tools and 
processes.  This has created an environment of significant risk exposure, including 
financial losses and data breach. 
According to IT professionals, the insider threat of a rogue employee is more 
likely to occur than an instance of hacking.31  In the report State of Security: What Keeps 
Infosec Pros Awake at Night,32 Wilson identifies what IT professionals consider to be the 
most significant threats.  He goes on to cite numerous studies and statistics for the various 
methodologies cyber criminals and hackers use to gain access to data.33  Wilson 
addresses budgetary issues that IT security management needs to be cognizant of as well 
as expectations of organizational management.34  The downfall of the article was that it 
did not address best practices or suggest some strategies form IT security professionals to 
employ.  The only suggestion made was to ensure that users were adequately trained in 
information security techniques.35  There has been a recent trend in IT security to train 
end users in some basic information security techniques.  Wilson advocates for education 
that could potentially cut down on the insider threat, which in his opinion is the most  
 
                                                 







significant issue.36  Thereby, Wilson reduces his IT security risk exposure.37  A more 
comprehensive look at best practices could identify some potential policy strategies that 
IT security staff could employ to reduce their risk. 
C. A HOMELAND SECURITY VULNERABILITY 
Another concern for homeland security is a potential attack on critical 
infrastructure.  For the most part, an attack on critical infrastructure would most likely be 
related to some type of terrorist activity, but it cannot be ruled out that it could be 
someone testing their hacking ability with no terrorism nexus at all.  Cyber terrorism is a 
real and emerging threat in the homeland security arena that is gaining momentum daily.  
There are ever increasing groups and companies that are willing to provide destructive 
services to the highest bidder.38 A small country or group with limited backing could 
potentially purchase a cyber weapon, deploy it and cripple a target’s critical 
infrastructure, financial system, or even military.39   
This concern is not without grounds. For example, the Government Accounting 
Office (GAO) reported a dramatic increase in cyber attacks on federal agencies, as 
reported to the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-Cert).  The cyber 
incidents totaled 41,776 in fiscal 2010, a 650 percent increase in five years.40   
The specter of a potential attack, coupled with the increased incidents in hacking, 
have resulted in the creation of new policy and sections within the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Defense (DoD), in addition to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to prepare for, prevent, and mitigate attacks on the United 
States and its interests.41 
                                                 
36 Wilson, “State of Security.” 
37 Ibid. 
38 Michael Riley and Ashlee Vance, “Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race,” Bloomberg Business 
Week, July 20, 2011. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Peter Behr, “A ‘Smart’ Grid Will Expose Utilities to Smart Computer Hackers,” New York Times, 
April 19, 2011. 
41 White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2011). 
 12
In anticipation of potential attacks against U.S. interests in 2008, DHS created the 
National Cyber Security Center (NCSC).  The NCSC is tasked with protecting the 
government’s cyber networks and will monitor, collect, and share information regarding 
cyber security incidents on systems belonging to National Security Agency (NSA), FBI, 
DoD, and DHS.42  DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano reaffirmed the importance of this 
effort with the creation of a new National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC).  In addition to its previous mission, it now includes “watch and 
warning” for incidents and threats that affect the nation’s critical information technology 
and cyber infrastructure.43  In May of 2010, the DoD created the first U.S. Cyber 
Command (CYBERCOM) and the first U.S. CYBERCOM Commander.  These policies 
and agencies were implemented because of the increase in cyber attacks and threats 
against the military.44  From these newly formed centers emerges national policies. In 
July 2011, DoD issued the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in 
Cyberspace.45  The White House has issued two policy papers, the Comprehensive 
National Cyber Security Initiative46 and the International Strategy for Cyberspace.47    
The Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative states that the President 
considers cyberspace to be of critical importance and appoints an executive branch cyber 
security coordinator.48  Additionally, it outlines 12 components for strengthening and 
addressing the federal networks as well as critical infrastructure.49  The 12 components 
                                                 
42 Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff on the 
Appointment of the Director of the National Cyber Security Center” [press release], March 20, 2008, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1206047924712.shtm (accessed August 18, 2011). 
43 Office of the Press Secretary, “Secretary Napolitano Opens New National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center” [press release], October 30, 2009, 
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1256914923094.shtm (accessed August 18, 2011). 
44 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), “DoD Announces First U.S. Cyber 
Command and First U.S. CYBERCOM Commander” [press release], May 21, 2010, 
http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=13551 (accessed August 18, 2011). 
45 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011). 
46 White House, The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, Policy (Washington, D.C.: 
White House, 2008). 
47 White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace. 
48 White House, Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative. 
49 Ibid. 
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address the key areas. If all areas could be addressed as easily as they are identified, it 
would greatly help the effort to strengthen the cyber risk. One of the key components 
identified directly pertains to this area of inquiry, specifically regarding supply chain 
threats.  The DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace provided that the DoD create a 
new cyber command and a new cyber range testing ground for cyber security efforts to be 
tested and proven.50  The policy stresses much of the information in the National Cyber 
Security Strategy, emphasizing partnerships and the need for a secure and robust 
network; again covering the critical areas.   
The International Strategy for Cyberspace51 outlines and reiterates a little of both 
the DoD Strategy and the National Cyber Security Strategy.  It also addresses the critical 
nature of the Internet and the world dependence on it for global commerce and 
transnational connections.52  Furthermore, it advocates collaboration and partnerships on 
a worldwide scale to keep the Internet safe and secure.  Furthermore, the strategy 
advocates global policing and prosecution of groups that perpetuate either disruption or 
interference with Internet traffic.  It takes adopts from the DoD Strategy for Operating in 
Cyberspace and states, “[t]he United States has a compelling interest in defending its 
vital national assets, as well as our core principles and values, and we are committed to 
defending against those who would attempt to impede our ability to do so.”53 The 
issuance of these three policies, two of which emerged from the White House, captures 
the significance that the government has placed on cyberspace.  A large amount of 
research and thought has been devoted to the core ideas of these strategies, but they are 
primarily focused around the federal network.  
Much has been written on cyber security policy and how experts suggest best 
strategies to combat cyber attackers.  These would include cyber terrorists and any other 
party that is a potential threat to the homeland.  However, I have been unable to find 
much information on the vulnerabilities of computer hardware.  These vulnerabilities 
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52 Ibid. 
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would be in the actual components themselves.  One of the only articles I have found is 
“Old Trick Threatens the Newest Weapons,”54 wherein Markoff talks about the potential 
threat of creating computer chips and hardware that has vulnerabilities built into it at the 
time of manufacture.  He implies that 98 percent of all computer hardware is purchased 
and built outside of the United States and its sterility cannot be validated.55  This concern 
has prompted the National Security Agency (NSA) to create its own manufacturing plant 
for the most sensitive equipment, but that amounts to less than two percent of the 
computers the government procures.  Markoff suggests that hardware can be in effect a 
Trojan horse wherein it is procured and deployed and when the moment is right, an attack 
initiated.56  The concern is that the compromised hardware can never be identified and 
acts as a sleeper until either it is signaled or the requisite time has passed for its job to be 
preformed.   
Specifically, it is in this area that more research needs to be completed.  The 
research that is available is very little and although acknowledged as a significant threat, 
it is not addressed adequately in policy or other documents.    
D. CONCLUSION 
There is extensive writing concerning cyber security. Most of this writing is 
related to malware and software attacks.  There is little written with respect to the 
hardware itself, which may be the largest vulnerability.  As explained above, the concept 
of cyber security as it relates to hardware is almost non-existent.  There are many 
hardware vectors that can be exploited to produce vulnerabilities. The security 
phenomenon for hardware has only recently begun to be exposed and documented.  Most 
of the literature describes a potential risk or outlines some possible threats, but there is 
little information available on specific documented incidents.  A few things are beginning  
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to be written on this topic but not a lot on the hardware layer. For information on this, I 
will have to continue to look and perhaps correspond with some professionals for 
opinions.  
There has been a great deal of interest, study, and reporting on hardware and 
recently the security implications.  While there is a well-developed understanding on the 
topic, our understanding of current vulnerability for homeland security would be 
improved by further research on what the vulnerabilities are and how we can mitigate the 
threat. Identifying how we can prevent these threats, or at least understand them, will 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 17
III. BACKGROUND: U.S. MICROCHIP INDUSTRY AND THE 
MOVE OVERSEAS 
The U.S. microchip industry was established in the 1950s by Jack Kilby of Texas 
Instruments and Robert Noyce of Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation.57  Kilby received 
the Noble Prize for physics in 2000 for his invention of the integrated circuit. Noyce 
perfected Kilby’s concept and continued to develop the integrated circuit making 
significant strides that are still in use today.  He ultimately left Fairchild and founded the 
Intel Corporation where he developed the modern day CPU, which is in most computers 
today.58   
From these humble beginnings, the integrated circuit or microchip industry 
evolved into a world dominating technology industry in Silicon Valley, California.  These 
companies, like many early U.S. companies, performed the entire manufacturing process 
at their plants, from the idea to the design and testing, then on to the procurement of the 
raw materials from other U.S. companies.  Fabrication, assembly, and final testing would 
then transpire at which point the companies would then market and sell their products, 
and provide support, all in one shop.59  This process had its ups and downs throughout 
the 60s and 70s, due primarily to labor and procurement issues, but significant innovation 
and developments were made in the microchip industry.  The beginnings of the shift 
began in the 1960s with the heavier labor cost operations outsourced to a location in 
another part of the world that had cheaper labor.60  As shareholders began to enjoy a taste 
of the new larger profits the companies were reaping from the lower cost of labor, more 
and more industry transferred offshore.  This trend continued with other manufacturing 
moving offshore to also lower costs and increase profits.   
                                                 
57 “The Integrated Circuit,” May 5, 2003, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/educational/physics/integrated_circuit/history/ (accessed October 22, 2012). 
58 Ibid. 
59 Michael French, US Economic History since 1945 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1997). 
60 Government Accounting Office, Offshoring. 
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The 1980s accelerated this shift due to a technology war with Japan.  Japan was 
producing microchips equal to and in some cases superior to the quality of the ones being 
produced in the U.S. but at prices below the cost of production.  To stay competitive U.S. 
microchip companies had to adapt and continue to develop, but they also had to cut 
costs.61  This movement continued to gain momentum as corporations found not only 
lower labor costs but also lower materials costs due to not having to ship to the U.S.  
Through the evolving manufacturing process, companies learned that they could save 
more money by outsourcing to companies that specialize in particular products rather 
than maintain the overhead of a company owned plant.  By doing this, the costs fell even 
more, again increasing profit margins.62 
The developing countries that hosted these industries embraced them, offering 
many tax breaks and other subsidies to entice their businesses.  On the darker side, the 
companies did not have to pay high wages or concern themselves with regulations 
regarding salary, working conditions, pollution, or anything they had to contend with in 
the U.S.  Additionally, the companies had access to a higher skilled and educated 
workforce that was capable of performing any task that was asked of them.63  This was a 
mutually beneficial proposition for them.   
The paradigm shifted for the microchip industry with two things, the Internet and 
the rise of the wafer fabrication foundries.  These were new and specialized 
manufacturing facilities, owned by companies offshore, full of cutting edge microchip 
manufacturing equipment that the for which individual U.S. microchip companies did not 
have to spend capital.  The Internet allowed for the immediate contact and transfer of data 
across the globe in an instant.  It was as if the offshore location was not as far.   
 
 
                                                 
61 Spencer Michaels, The Growth of the Microchip [PBS interview by Jim Lehrer online], January 1, 
1993, PBS Newshour, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/jan-june93/chip_1-1-93.html (accessed 
October 1, 2012). 
62 David Barboza, Peter Lattman, and Catherine Rampell, “How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work,” 
New York Times, January 21, 2012. 
63 Ibid. 
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Additionally, the cost for the new foundries was now spread over all of the companies 
that used them.  This new way of production reduced the U.S. microchip production 
share to 20 percent.64   
This trend in offshore fabrication has continued due to the newer technological 
challenges of the cutting edge designs and capabilities of the new microchips.  These new 
products require new and advanced fabrication facilities.  What could be accomplished in 
some of the older fabrication facilities is no longer relevant in the new environment.  
These new facilities cost even more than the predecessors, which make the option for in-
house manufacture insurmountable for an individual company.65  Add to this an ever-
increasing demand for product—because now everything from cars to weapons requires 
microchips to function.  
There are still a few companies that are known as integrated device 
manufacturers, meaning they have the capability to complete the production of a 
microchip.  However, even though they can produce microchips, they are only doing so 
for older models. They are outsourcing the newer designs to an offshore foundry.  Many 
of these companies are ones that are thought of as U.S. companies, “made in the USA;” 
however, that may not be the case as seen in Table 1.  The U.S. government contracts for 
sensitive hardware with IBM, which owns a “trusted” foundry in Vermont for 
manufacturing those products.66 However, this foundry cannot serve the needs of the 
entire government, especially regarding some of the specialty or newest designs.   
Table 2 is a listing of various manufacturers, their production model and the 
locations of their corporate offices.  Many are thought to be “made in the USA” 
companies, but in reality they are not.  This issue can become more convoluted because 
many of these corporations buy companies or have subsidiaries that can do business for 
the production of microchips with one of the outsourcing companies.  One example is 
                                                 
64 Government Accounting Office, Offshoring. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Richard McCormack, “$600 Million Over 10 Years for IBM’s ‘Trusted Foundry’ Chip Industry’s 
Shift Overseas Elicits National Security Agency, Defense Department Response,” Manufacturing and 
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Microsemi SoC Products Group.  This company is a leading provider of field 
programmable gate array (FPGA) microchips to the U.S. government and is discussed in 
greater detail later in the paper.  They are not on the trusted foundry list, however they 
are a “partner” of companies that are and purport to provide microchips to the military 
and aerospace industries.67   
Table 2.   2011 Top 25 Fabless Integrated Circuit Suppliers68 
  
Table 3 is the top list of the fabless foundries, meaning the company designs and 
outsources fabrication. 
                                                 
67 Microsemi SoC Products Group, Microsemi SoC Products Group—Partners, 2012, 
http://www.actel.com/products/partners/solution/ip/specialization.aspx (accessed November 8, 2012). 
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Table 3.   2011 Major Integrated Circuit Foundries69 
 
Table 4 is a list of the top foundries, meaning they manufacture for anyone.  
                                                 
69 “2011Major Integrated Circuit Foundries” [Strategic Reviews Database, company reports], IC 
Insights, 2011. 
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Table 4.   Top Foundries Worldwide: Headquarter Location and  
Manufacturing Location70  
 
 
An example of a company that went off shore is the National Semiconductor 
Corporation.  This company was established in 1959, in the beginning of the microchip 
                                                 
70 Bryan Krekel, Patton Adams, and George Bakos, Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese 
Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage (Washington, D.C.: Northrop 
Grumman Corp., 2012). 
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era in Silicon Valley.  It is still a leading U.S. manufacturer of semiconductors used in 
many electronics applications; however, during the Asian price wars in the 1980s the 
company, as many others, entered a severe downturn.  The decline was so severe the 
company asked Washington to impose trade sanctions against the Japanese.71  The 
company survived and was one of the first companies to move its assembly operation 
offshore in an effort to save money and reestablish itself.  This business decision proved 
beneficial and National Semiconductor returned to profitable status.  It went on to buyout 
several other competitors, including Fairchild Semiconductor and Cyrix, and later 
established a fabrication foundry in China.72  Recently, it has partnered with Taiwan 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), the largest producer of microchips 
in the world.  Although this microchip producer has a history and a presence in the U.S., 
it is in reality a foreign company. 
Another surprising company that changed its corporate structure to the offshore 
outsourcing model is Texas Instruments (TI).  Founded in 1951 in Dallas, Texas, it is 
credited with having the inventor of the first integrated circuit; Jack Kilby employed 
there.  The company has a long and storied relationship with the military, having 
provided military computers, armament, and radar systems.  But semiconductor 
production makes up the majority of the businesses revenue.  In fact, TI has bought out 
nine other semiconductor companies.  Despite the lucrative contracts from the military, 
TI also encountered the cash flow issues in the 1980s, which resulted in the company 
merging with the Japanese firm Hitachi to develop a new microchip.  This move helped 
restructure and save the company.  As a part of the restructuring and cost reduction, it 
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continued to invest heavily in the fabrication industry in Asia, pledging to invest a billion 
dollars in manufacturing.73  TI is another example of a U.S. rooted company that has 
extremely deep ties to foreign interests.   
As can be seen in Tables 1 through 3, many microchip companies, which are 
thought of as manufacturing within the U.S., have their fabrication done at offshore 
facilities.  Others have links to the offshore industry through various business 
relationships.  The primary driving force for the exodus of the microchip manufacturing 
process is profit.  This situation, however, creates a significant vulnerability to national 
security through the use of these microchips in critical systems when they are 
manufactured in countries that are not allies of the U.S.    
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IV. MANUFACTURING OF MICROCHIPS IN CHINA: 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS  
China and Taiwan supply the majority of the microchips imported by the United 
States government Department of Defense and private industry with more than two-thirds 
market.74 There is a concern that microchips manufactured in China and purchased by the 
U.S. government may contain a manufactured vulnerability.  Dr. William Howard, Task 
Force Chairman of the 2005 Defense Science Board Task Force on High Performance 
Microchip Supply, stated, “Our greatest concern lies in microelectronics supplies for 
defense, national infrastructure and intelligence applications.…Urgent action is 
recommended…”75  This was due to the findings of the task force regarding identified 
vulnerabilities in the supply chain.76   
Additionally, the Emerging Cyber Threats Report for 2012, put together during 
the Georgia Tech Cyber Security Summit, identifies hardware as an emerging threat.77  
More specifically, it claims that threats are becoming embedded in the hardware that 
modify the basic input/output system BIOS.78  These threats come via the hardware 
supply chain.  According to Andrew Howard, research scientist at Georgia Tech Research 
Institute:  
Twenty years ago when power stations weren’t IP enabled, that may have been 
less of a concern.  But now that we are phasing out legacy hardware for newer 
equipment that is connected to the Internet, it could open a vulnerability to 
something like Stuxnet.79  
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The new concern is that perhaps there is another layer of vulnerability out there, 
one at the hardware layer.  One that is hard coded and cannot be corrected without the 
replacement of the corrupt part—a microchip that has a purposeful manufactured 
vulnerability. 
Much is been written on the speculation that China or others are manufacturing 
microchips and other computer electronics that have back doors and trojans within 
them;80 however, so far there are no unclassified reports of any vulnerabilities exploited 
by the Chinese or others.  Supply chain vulnerability has been well documented and the 
definitive document is from the 2005 Defense Science Board Task Force on High 
Performance Microchip Supply Report, which identifies the possibility for a supplying 
country to curtail production as a means to impact the outcome of a conflict.81 It also 
identifies the possibility for the purposeful manufacturing of vulnerabilities.82  
Specifically, the Defense Science Board (DSB) warned that the shift towards greater 
foreign circuit production posed the risk that “trojan horse” circuits could be 
unknowingly installed in critical military systems. The DSB warned that foreign 
adversaries could modify chips to self destruct or add secret back doors that would place 
a kill switch in military systems.83  However, to date, few of the recommendations in the 
report have been implemented to avoid the identified vulnerabilities.   
In a War College thesis titled Semiconductor Technology and U.S. National 
Security, Colonel (COL) Lawerence K. Harada wrote about the concerns associated with 
transfer of the semiconductor (microchip) industry from the U.S. to China.84  That “[t]his 
transfer is a national security concern and the U.S. must regain worldwide leadership 
semiconductor technology to maintain a technological advantage over other adversaries.”  
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He specifically states that current export policies to China have failed, and they must be 
aggressively addressed because of the loss of intellectual property.85   
In addition, numerous reports have identified the supply chain threats. “The main 
threat to product trustworthiness is the intentional inclusion or insertion of exploitable 
vulnerabilities, backdoors or malicious logic,”86 says a State of the Art Report (SOAR) 
prepared by the Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC) on 
Security Risk Management for Off-the Shelf (OTS) Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) Supply Chain. Additionally, numerous threats to the ICT supply chain 
are identified and the potential impact to the DoD and all government agencies are 
detailed.  The report suggests several options to mitigate the threat as it exists today and 
offers some suggestions for future strategies as well.87    
There is no empirical data regarding microchip or hardware compromise; 
however, much what exists is with respect to supply chain vulnerability issues.88 There 
are numerous documented instances of hacking or theft of intellectual property.89  The 
aggressiveness and increased instances of unclassified attacks on federal government 
computer systems, DoD systems and federal contractor systems continues to rise, with 
the majority coming from Eastern Europe and Asia.90  Therefore, it can be hypothesized 
that new vectors for attack will be identified and that hardware or microchip vulnerability 
could be exploited if the attacker had knowledge of it.   
David M. Abel and Kyle I. Fox conducted a detailed analysis of documented 
unclassified supply chain incidents from 1988 to 2011.  They found in the majority of the 
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183 incidents that the vendor or subcontractor took responsibility for the supply chain 
malware; however, that does not mean they were responsible for the inclusion, only that 
they took responsibility.91  There was only one verifiable instance attributed to a nation 
state in their unclassified report.92  This is surprising, considering what has been written 
regarding the potential for exploitation by nation states.93  Their analysis also showed 
that although the vendor or subcontractor took responsibility, there are still unanswered 
questions as to who perpetrated the attack and why; there were also a large percentage 
that were attributed to “unknown.”94  Some potential reasons for this could be the lack of 
trusted oversight or trusted quality control in the process.  Finally, if we add the incidents 
that responsibility was taken with the “unknown,” the total number of incidents is by far 
the majority, so further analysis is warranted in this area.  
Appendix A details significant cyber incidents since 2006 to present as collated 
by James Andrew Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.  Of course, 
these are incidents that have become known and are not classified.  See Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Breakdown of Cyber Attacks since 200695 
As can be seen in Figure 2 there has been a steady increase in cyber attacks since 
2006, the majority (Figure 1) of which can be attributed to an attacker with a Chinese 
origin (57 percent of identified attacks and 30 percent of all).96  These are discounting the 
unknown attacks, which account for 47 percent of the total.97  These numbers are 
significant in they clearly show a pattern that cyber attacks are not only on the rise, but 
that hackers in China are the number one point of origin. The numbers also demonstrate 
that if they are attacking, they will exploit any vulnerability they can, including those 
purposefully manufactured in a microchip.    
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Figure 2.  Number of Significant Incidents by Year98 
According to Verizon, which conducts an annual study in conjunction with the 
United States Secret Service (USSS) into data breech investigations, 92 percent of the 
breeches reported were from external agents with 73 percent exploiting a backdoor or 
control channel.99  This is significant because it validates the concern regarding the 
potential for someone to exploit a backdoor in a microchip. See Figure 3.  
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Figure 3.  Types of Hacking by Percent of Breeches100 
Greg Schaffer, Acting Deputy Undersecretary at the Department of Homeland 
Security’s National Protection and Programs Directorate, testified before the House 
Oversight and Government Reform Committee in July of 2011.  When asked by 
Representative Chaffetz whether he was aware of any foreign-manufactured software or 
hardware components that had been purposely embedded with security risks, the DHS 
representative stated that “I am aware of instances where that has happened.”101  Though 
he did not elaborate or cite what type of equipment was compromised, he did say that 
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foreign components are in many “American” manufactured devices.102  This statement is 
significant because it is one of the first public acknowledgements by a high-ranking 
government official of this issue. 
As previously stated there have been numerous instances of malware being 
embedded in a device, only later identified.  However there has been no unclassified 
acknowledgement of instances where a microchip or the hardware was identified with a 
manufactured vulnerability.   The concerns about a purposefully manufactured 
vulnerability, and statements such as these, have prompted investigations by various 
committees in the House and Senate.  One such investigation is being conducted by 
Representative Mike Rogers (R-Michigan), the chairman of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence.  The committee was looking into the possibility for the 
Chinese government to tamper with telecommunications equipment, thereby allowing it 
to spy, threaten our critical infrastructure, or obtain intellectual property from the U.S. 103 
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V. THE MICROCHIP: ITS USE, MISUSE, AND INSPECTIONS 
A. USE 
A microchip is defined as a small silicon wafer or integrated circuit.104  Each 
microchip has a designed function to perform in relation to a larger operation.  An 
analogy to this would be a gear in a watch.  The gear provides a specific function within 
the watch and without it the watch may not function correctly, if at all.  The microchips 
are put together on a board to perform a process.  An example of a process would be to 
go into sleep mode or enter into a wireless mode.  Microchips are in most electronic 
devices, from cars to computers, from weapons to refrigerators.  They provide a specific 
action to be taken once power is applied to them, before any software or operating system 
engages.  They start the software, which is why a purposefully manufactured 
vulnerability in a chip is so dangerous; it cannot be caught by antivirus or malware 
programs.  
Actel/Microsemi ProASIC3 FPGA, which is sold by Microsemi SoC Products 
Group and is manufactured offshore in Taiwan by United Microelectronics Corporation 
(UMC),105 is an example of a microchip that is in use today by the military106 in critical 
infrastructure and in commercial aviation.  According to the manufacturer’s Website, this 
particular microchip is used by the military and in avionics systems, such as mission 
computers, navigation, and guidance systems.  All of these are critical systems.  In 
commercial aviation, it is used in the new Boeing 787 Dreamliner.  The military is 
extremely reliant on this particular type of microchip because of the flexibility that it  
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offers.  It allows the chip to be programmed to perform whatever task required, often 
being referred to as a “glue chip,” one that functions as the core for all else to be attached 
to.107 
 
Figure 4.  FPGA Application Uses108  
Another example is the microchips produced by Intel for use in computers, 
servers, and mobile devices as well as other types of peripherals, including 
motherboards.109  These microchips are in use in approximately 80 percent of personal 
computers worldwide,110 which include the military and government at all levels.  In  
 
 
                                                 
107 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition (Technology & Logistics), Special 
Technology Area Review on Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) for Military Applications 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense Advisory Group on Electron Devices, 2005). 
108 Ibid. 
109 “Intel,” Intel Corporation, http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/homepage.html# (accessed 
November 8, 2012). 
110 International Directory of Company Histories, s.v. “Intel Inc.,” 2002, 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Intel_Corp.aspx (accessed November 8, 2012). 
 35
2010, Intel opened a new fabrication facility in China, but it has operated assembly and 
testing facilities in China, Malaysia, and Vietnam since 2005.  These are two examples of 
uses of microchips and their manufacturers’ practices. 
B. MISUSE 
So how exactly would something like manufactured hardware vulnerability work?  
What could it do?  Before answering these questions, it is important to note that unlike 
software, which can be updated to correct issues or problems with the programming code, 
hardware is designed and manufactured with the built-in code. For the most part, this 
code cannot be changed or corrected after the microchip leaves the factory.  The only 
way to address the issue would be to replace the compromised unit with an 
uncompromised one.  Once the compromised microchip leaves the factory, there are 
numerous ways that a vulnerability could be exploited on whatever system it was 
installed.  A certain date or physical location could wake the process up, at which point it 
would execute the preprogrammed attack.  Like a sleeper, it could be waiting for a certain 
number of days before it executes or even a call from the owner.  Of course, the latter 
would be predicated on access to the Internet or a phone line.  The type action that could 
be taken can be anything from a backdoor allowing remote access to systems to an 
automated download of classified data or even a remote kill switch that would shut off 
whatever system the microchip was in.111  
An example of this type of exploit would the Flame attack on the computer 
networks of Iran.  Flame installed itself on the host computer and then opened a backdoor 
and called home for further instruction and to download information that it had initially 
gathered from the host.112 This is very significant because nearly every military or 
governmental system today utilizes some type of commercially manufactured microchip. 
There are two basic points in the microchip production process that are vulnerable 
to attack; the design phase and the fabrication phase.  For the most part, a microchip is 
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designed for a particular use and as such requires a design and building plan.  These plans 
are then checked to ensure that they meet the requirements and specifications at which 
point they are given to the fabrication foundry where the chips are actually made.  Today, 
these two processes are oftentimes split with the design done in the U.S. by the microchip 
company.  The design plan is then sent to the foundry offshore where the microchips are 
fabricated.  The highest probable attack vector would be in the design phase.  This is 
because all designs have to be logic tested to ensure that they work properly.  If a 
malicious process was embedded, it would have to be tested logically to ensure it is 
compatible with the rest of the process on the microchip.  It is much easier to see how a 
malicious process will function in a computer testing environment than trying to see if it 
works after being introduced during fabrication.113  During the design phase, the 
malevolent actor can disguise the process as legitimate and the plan can be modified to 
accommodate the malicious code and ensure compatibility in functionality, only now 
with the vulnerability included.   
During the fabrication process, a modification is more difficult because the logic 
on the microchip has already been validated with the initial design.  Therefore, any 
addition to the microchip at that point could cause a conflict and render the chip 
inoperative or impact the functionality in some way that would flag it as a problem.  At 
that point, the microchip would be scrutinized to determine what causes the problem and 
the malicious process could be identified.  This is not to say that a microchip could not be 
compromised at this point in the process, but it would be a little more difficult.  One way 
that this could be accomplished would be to obtain a functional, unmodified microchip 
that could then be reverse engineered so that the malicious actors could insert a 
modification and vet it to ensure it does not impact the functionality.  Once that is 
determined, an additional step could be taken during the manufacturing process to insert 
the vulnerability on all subsequently fabricated microchips.  Regardless of the source, 
once a microchip has been manufactured with vulnerability the likelihood of it being 
identified is almost nil.114 
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According to Sergei Skorobogatov of Cambridge University, not only does the 
threat exist, but he has found backdoors on existing chips.115  He recently developed a 
non-invasive/non destructive testing process for microchips called pipeline emission 
analysis and tested a commercial off the shelf field programmable gate array (FPGA) 
chip (see Figure 5).116 This is the most commonly used chip type by defense contractors.  
End users such as the DoD like this chip because, though it has basic functionality 
programmed into it, it highly customizable to the individual need via a software layer.  
Because it is a multi-use chip, it comes with many transistors that may not be needed for 
the particular use, thereby providing multiple opportunities to embed a malicious process, 
which would be almost impossible to find.  Skorobogatov and Cambridge University are 
the first researcher/research institution that has successfully tested off the shelf 
Actel/Microsemi ProASIC3 FPGA in current use today and found a preprogrammed 
backdoor in the silicon of a microchip itself.  This particular chip was chosen because of 
its high security specifications and widespread military use.  From the manufacturers 
product information says “…offers one of the highest levels of design security in the 
industry.”117   
All levels of security were evaluated and each was able to be circumvented.  
Additionally, they were able to extract the secret key to activate the backdoor, as well as 
other security keys for the device.118  Through the use of this vulnerability, a malicious 
actor could extract all of the data from the chip, reprogram it, or even permanently 
damage the device.  In pursuing any of these options, the actor could then open other 
backdoors on the system if it is installed on or even take any information he or she 
wanted.   
Their discovery was important in two ways. First, it was non invasive, and 
second, it confirmed what many had suspected, vulnerability is being manufactured in the 
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microchips and the supply chain has been compromised by the introduction of these 
vulnerable chips. The implications of this finding are very significant119 because the 
backdoor exists on the silicon itself and not any firmware loaded on the chip.  
Additionally, Skorobogatov is concerned that since this type of chip is designed for 
“secure” remote access, it would be possible for an attacker to initiate a large scale 
remote attack via the Internet.  Other products from Actel/Microsemi were analyzed and 
all were found to have the same backdoor.120  This raises serious questions about the 
integrity of the manufacturers and their respective security practices.  As previously 
stated, having a hardware vulnerability negates any attempt at security through software 
because the attacker can always circumvent the system through the most base layer, the 
hardware.  As a result of these findings, decisions will have to be made as how to 
remediate what is already in production and how security is enforced in future 
production.121     
                                                 





Figure 5.  An Example of a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)122 
C. CURRENT QUALITY CONTROL PROCESSES AND 
ASSOCIATED CHALLENGES 
As stated above, the microchip fabrication process is twofold.  The first phase is 
the design phase and the second the fabrication phase.  During each phase, there are 
extensive quality control processes to ensure that the microchips not only function but 
function correctly.  One could easily think “aha, this is the step where the vulnerabilities 
will be found,” not necessarily.  During the design phase, the chip functionality is 
designed and worked out on a computer aided design or CAD software.  The software 
ensures the compatibility and functionality for what processes the microchips are being 
designed to perform.  There can be as many as a million gates or more on a microchip 
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making extensive testing for security all but impossible.123  The “bugs” are tested for and 
there are some random tests conducted periodically, but it is easy to hide a malicious 
process behind another that would never be discovered.  It is for this reason that, for the 
most part, the design process is conducted in the microchip company’s home base where 
they have more control.  However, it is at this stage that the process is most 
vulnerable.124 
The fabrication phase is outsourced, usually offshore or elsewhere where the costs 
are minimized.  An attack at the fabrication phase is more difficult because a change to 
the hardware could adversely impact the functionality of the microchip and be identified 
during a quality control process.  However, it could be accomplished if the chip design 
was obtained and the change was logically checked to ensure the functionality.  It could 
also be introduced in a regularly manufactured microchip that had been reversed 
engineered and the functionality checked with the added vulnerability.125  The process 
would at that point again be the same with respect to the introduction to the supply chain; 
they would then be introduced and consumed by the intended users.  
The largest issue that is being confronted by microchip consumers is the difficulty 
in testing to validate integrity.  Current technology uses several methods to validate the 
integrity of microchips. All of these are extremely time consuming and expensive to 
conduct, and most are destructive.  The first method involves applying x-ray technology 
to the chip.  This method can be destructive if the x-rays are too strong; furthermore, it 
can be difficult to discern the functionality of specific circuits.  However, a company in 
California is building nondestructive x-ray microscopes that are already used and is 
experimenting with its use for security purposes.  The second method is reverse 
engineering.  This requires grinding the chip down layer by layer, and taking photos of 
the process via an electron microscope until the entire chip is imaged.  The images of the 
chip can then be compared to the originally designed microchip.  Also, each individual 
circuit’s functionality can be scrutinized to determine what process it actually performs.  
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This process is extremely labor intensive, destructive, and very expensive.  It is not very 
reliable because manufacturers, designers, and malicious actors anticipate this will occur 
and build security measures into the chip to camouflage the functionality.126 The third 
process involves some type of electrical monitoring.  All microchips require electricity to 
function.  Testing them for the amount of electricity used or their resistance and 
comparing those findings to a standard can identify a potential security flaw.127  
Which one of these processes is the best at identifying an issue?  They all have 
their respective shortcomings, and none of them can perform an absolute validation, but 
this is where technology in this field is currently.  Obviously, each of these processes is 
incredibly laborious and cost prohibitive, as well as destructive.  Thus far, there has been 
no microchip integrity validation process identified that is not destructive or cost 
prohibitive.  This concern had led DARPA and IARPA to issue solicitations for proposals 
for new innovative ways to perform these validations.128  This program has industry 
leaders attempting to identify malicious code inserted into microchips with a 90 percent 
probability.129   
Many security-observers question whether a purposefully manufactured 
vulnerability could be built into hardware such as a microchip in a way that is not 
detected. According to research at the University of Illinois, it can be and was done.130 
The University of Illinois Computer Science Department sought to prove that it is 
possible to implant an undetectable vulnerability on a microchip.  They then did it and 
provided the compromised chip along with uncompromised chips to researchers to see if 
they could determine, which was the compromised chip.  This was done utilizing current 
technology.  The researchers were not successful in finding the vulnerability so the 
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university was able to prove their point that it can be done.131  The concern is significant 
enough to warrant DARPA and IARPA to begin initiatives to identify potential microchip 
vulnerabilities.132  As stated previously, the current process for identifying compromised 
microchips is very difficult, time consuming and expensive.  Even in doing so, the correct 
identification of a potential vulnerability is not a sure thing.   
Only recently are governmental agencies looking seriously at the possibility of 
microchip vulnerability. According to Dr. Carl McCants, a Program Manager at DARPA, 
there have been no documented instances that a microchip has been compromised.133  He 
went on to say there has been speculation and instances of malware being inserted on a 
platform, but nothing that can be attributed to this actually having occurred.134  
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VI. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CYBER SECURITY 
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PURPOSEFULLY MANIPULATED 
MICROCHIP ISSUE  
A paradigm shift is happening in cyber security that creates a change in tactics 
and policies.  The cyber security community will adapt and evolve, just as it always has.  
The new threat is compromised hardware.  One aspect of compromised hardware is the 
microchip.  As we have discussed, microchips are not only vulnerable to the actors who 
were responsible for the purposefully manufacturing, but now this new vulnerability has 
been exposed and anyone with the right skill set can exploit it. This creates additional 
overarching cyber security concerns, with new vectors for attack that cannot be “patched” 
via a software upgrade.  The “key” to these attacks has now been published, along with a 
how to guide; it will be only a matter of time before attacks begin.   
Attacks on computer systems can range from disruption of critical infrastructure 
to financial gain, and now, even in the military theatre.  The definition of cybercrime is 
criminal activity done using computers and the Internet.135  This definition is very broad 
and growing more so each day as more illegal computer activities are being committed 
and identified. The economic impact is enormous and, as a crime, the impact on 
investigative resources will be significant as well.  According to Symantec, a leading 
provider of internet security products, cybercrime cost victims $388 billion in time and 
money last year alone, hitting 431 million people in 24 countries.136  That number is 
rising steadily; the 54 percent of online adults who were victims of computer virus or 
malware attacks this year is up from 51 percent last year.137  Additionally, attacks against 
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tablets, and other mobile devices were targeted for malware attacks last year, as 
compared with 2009.138  This is a clear indication that cybercrime is increasing and must 
be addressed.   
Although the financial impact of cyber criminal activity and intellectual property 
theft cannot be completely quantified, the White House issued the Cyber Security Policy 
Review, which profiled the systemic loss of U.S. economic value from intellectual 
property and data theft in 2008 as high as one trillion dollars.139 
Another concern for cybercrime investigators is a potential attack on critical 
infrastructure.  For the most part, an attack on critical infrastructure would most likely be 
related to some type of terrorist activity, but it cannot be ruled out that it could be 
someone testing his or her hacking ability with no terrorism nexus at all.  Cyber terrorism 
is a real and emerging threat in the homeland security arena, and it is gaining momentum 
daily.  There are ever increasing groups and companies that are willing to provide 
destructive services to the highest bidder.140 A small country or group with limited 
backing could potentially purchase a cyber weapon, deploy it, and cripple a target’s 
critical infrastructure, financial system, or even military.141   
Federal agencies report increasing cyber-intrusions into government computer 
networks, perpetrated by a range of known and unknown actors.  Therefore, cyber 
security has become a pressing national security issue.142  In fact, many national security 
experts have stated both in public and before various governmental committees that the 
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National Intelligence Mike McConnell stated that cyber weapons were equivalent to 
weapons of mass destruction if utilized by terrorists in an attack on the U.S. 
infrastructure.143   
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported a dramatic increase in cyber 
attacks on federal agencies, as reported to the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team (US-Cert).  The cyber incidents totaled 41,776 in fiscal 2010, a 650 percent 
increase in five years.144  During the month of August, there were 30 documented serious 
incidents of hacktivism.  Hacktivism is defined as the use of computers and computer 
networks as a means of protest to promote political ends.145  Some of the tools that are 
regularly used include Website defacements, redirects, denial-of-service attacks, 
information theft, Website parodies, virtual sit-ins, and virtual sabotage, all of which are 
crimes that would need to be investigated and prosecuted.   
The specter of a potential attack, coupled with the increased incidents in hacking, 
have resulted in the creation of new policy and sections within DHS and DoD, in addition 
to the FBI, to prepare for, prevent, and mitigate attacks on the United States and its 
interests.146  The DHS has been charged, by law, with certain cyber responsibilities; 
specifically “to protect the federal executive branch civilian agencies, and to lead the 
protection of critical cyberspace.”147  However, as with the intelligence community, there 
is a fragmented response to cyber issues as there is no one agency responsible for the 
entire over arching strategy.   
In anticipation of potential attacks against U.S. interests in 2008, DHS created the 
National Cybersecurity Center (NCSC).  The NCSC is tasked with protecting the 
government’s cyber networks and will monitor, collect and share information regarding 
cyber security incidents on systems belonging to National Security Agency (NSA), FBI, 
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DoD, and DHS.148  DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano reaffirmed the importance of this 
effort with the creation of a new National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC).  In addition to its previous mission, it now includes “watch and 
warning” for incidents and threats that affect the nation’s critical information technology 
and cyber infrastructure.149   
In May of 2010, the DoD created the first U.S. Cyber Command and the first U.S. 
CYBERCOM Commander.  These policies and agencies were implemented because of 
the increase in cyberattacks and threats against the military.150  From these newly formed 
centers emerge national policies. In July 2011, DoD issued the Department of Defense 
Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.151  The White House has issued two policy papers, 
the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative152 and the International Strategy for 
Cyberspace.153    
The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative states that the President 
considers cyberspace to be of critical importance and appoints an executive branch Cyber 
security coordinator.154  Additionally, it outlines 12 components for strengthening and 
addressing the federal networks as well as critical infrastructure.  The 12 components 
address the key areas.  If all areas could be addressed as easily as they are identified, it 
would greatly help the effort to strengthen the cyber risk. One of the key components 
identified directly pertains to this area of inquiry, specifically regarding supply chain 
threats.  However, the weak link that is not addressed is the requirement that identifies 
which entity will have principal cyber security responsibility and does give one 
individual authority over all entities for cyber related efforts.   
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The DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace provided that the DoD create a 
new cyber command and a new cyber range testing ground for cyber security efforts to be 
tested and proven.155  The policy stresses much of the information in the National 
Cybersecurity Strategy, emphasizing partnerships and the need for a secure and robust 
network (again covering the critical areas).  The International Strategy for Cyberspace 
outlines and reiterates a little of both the DoD Strategy and the National Cybersecurity 
Strategy.  It also addresses the critical nature of the Internet and the world dependence on 
it for global commerce and transnational connections.  Furthermore, it advocates 
collaboration and partnerships on a worldwide scale to keep the Internet safe and secure, 
and global policing and prosecution of groups that perpetuate either disruption or 
interference with Internet traffic.  It borrows from the DoD Strategy for Operating in 
Cyberspace and states, “[t]he United States has a compelling interest in defending its 
vital national assets, as well as our core principles and values, and we are committed to 
defending against those who would attempt to impede our ability to do so.”156  The 
issuance of these three policies, two of which emerged from the White House, captures 
the significance that the government has placed on cyberspace.  A large amount of 
research and thought has been devoted to the core ideas of these strategies, but they are 
primarily focused around the federal network.  
President Obama, via Presidential Directive, created the National Cyber 
Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) in 2008 to be the tip of the spear for a 
coordinated effort by all governmental agencies in domestic cyber investigations. This 
Task Force is represented by 18 intelligence and law enforcement agencies that have 
been charged with identifying key players and schemes. Its goal is to try to predict and 
prevent the developing trends in cybercrime or attacks and to pursue the persons behind 
the attacks.   
Clearly, there are significant concerns surrounding this topic, so much so that the 
President has repeatedly made statements acknowledging the significance as to what is at 
stake. However, despite enactment of multiple policies, the introduction of several bills in 
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Congress, and numerous Congressional hearings, little progress has been made toward a 
definitive plan for addressing the cyber issue.  In fact, other than the previously discussed 
policies regarding the manufacture of microchips at a trusted foundry and the initiatives 
funded through DARPA/IARPA, there has been little other progress on the identification 
of compromised microchips.  Other than a vague acknowledgement of a future policy on 
procurement, little of the recommendations in any of the numerous reports identified in 
this thesis have been implemented.  
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VII. CONCLUSION AND OPTIONS 
According to government studies and findings by the private sector, China has 
engaged in numerous activities to exploit vulnerabilities found in technologies that 
support many U.S. financial and security processes.  China is the number one threat to the 
United States with respect to cyber attacks and intellectual property theft, according to 
the findings published by the Office of National Counterintelligence Executive.157 
Colonel Jayson Spade says the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is preparing for total 
cyber warfare.158  It is conducting cyberspace reconnaissance; creating the ability to do 
economic harm and damage critical infrastructure; preparing to disrupt communications 
and information systems necessary to support conventional armed conflict; and readying 
to conduct psychological operations to influence the will of the American people.159  
These attacks will exploit whatever vulnerabilities it has identified, including those that 
have been purposefully manufactured.  There have been multiple instances of Chinese 
nationals infiltrating U.S. companies and later getting arrested for stealing intellectual 
property and designs,160 and McAfee says China is the number one state-sanctioned 
hacking organization in the world. It is responsible for the majority of attacks against the 
U.S. government and the private industry.161   
Much has been written on cyber security policy and how experts suggest best 
strategies to combat cyber attackers.  These would include cyber terrorists and any other 
party that is a potential threat to the homeland.  However I have been unable to find much 
documented information on the vulnerabilities of computer hardware.  These 
vulnerabilities would be in the actual components themselves.   
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One of the articles I have found is “Old Trick Threatens the Newest Weapons,”162 
wherein Markoff talks about the potential threat of creating computer chips and hardware 
that has vulnerabilities built into it at the time of manufacture.  He implies that 98 percent 
of all computer hardware is purchased and built outside of the United States and its 
sterility cannot be validated.163  This concern has prompted the NSA to create its own 
manufacturing plant for the most sensitive equipment, but that amounts to less than two 
percent of the computers the government procures.  Markoff suggests that hardware can 
be in effect a Trojan horse wherein it is procured and deployed, and when the moment is 
right, vulnerability is exploited or other attack is initiated.164  The concern is that the 
compromised hardware can never be identified and acts as a sleeper until either it is 
signaled or the requisite time has passes for its job to be preformed.  John Villasenor, of 
UCLA, says “…the need to proactively address hardware security remains widely 
underappreciated”165 when speaking about the importance of ensuring hardware security 
in the age of globalization and the complex issues that accompany it.    
The discovery by Sergei Skorobogatov of Cambridge University validates the 
concerns that have been sounded by many previously.166  This is the first documented 
incident of purposefully manufactured hardware vulnerability.  The implications to the 
homeland security enterprise are enormous.  The fact that there is an identified security 
flaw in a microchip that potentially is used in military, government, and other critical 
infrastructure, regardless of how it was implemented, must be addressed quickly to 
ensure that it is not exploited by either those who put it there or other malicious actors. It 
is specifically in this area that more research needs to be completed.  There is very little 
research available and, although acknowledged as a significant threat, the security 
concerns about microchips are not adequately addressed in policy or other documents.   
                                                 
162 Markoff. “Old Trick Threatens the Newest Weapons.” 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Villasenor, “Ensuring Hardware Cybersecurity.” 
166 Skorobogatov and Woods, Breakthrough Silicon Scanning. 
 51
What can be done to address the vulnerability?  First and foremost, acknowledge 
there is an issue and take action rather than deny that there is a problem.167  All 
microchips that are brought into the U.S. for use in critical systems must be randomly 
checked for vulnerability.  The feasibility for complete testing on every microchip is not 
viable due to time and cost factors.  Appropriate action needs to be taken for any 
identified offending manufacturers.  This would be a potential political issue if it was 
determined that a nation state was involved.  A full investigation would be required for 
any U.S. based company involvement to determine the extent of the company’s 
knowledge and/or collusion, which would then have to be addressed as well.  A strategy 
must be developed that prioritizes, based on criticality, the replacement of the 
compromised hardware from trusted manufacturers’ products.  This may require sections 
of industry, government or infrastructure to be operating at a less than optimal level 
during the remediation.   
For the future, clear legislation must be enacted, defining not only the cyber 
parameters but also the boundaries or jurisdictional lines.  The federal government is 
currently the responsible party for investigation of cyber crimes; however the number of 
incidents reported continues to grow at an almost exponential level.  This will require a 
push down to the local level for some of these investigations, which can only be 
accomplished through legislation.  In addition policy needs to be created clearly 
delineating the hierarchy for cyber activities.  A single responsible person with 
appropriate authority needs to coordinate all cyber activities.  Responsibilities can be 
delegated to agencies based on expertise, but a repeat of what has occurred with 
intelligence cannot be allowed to happen again.  
There is extensive writing concerning cyber security. Most of this writing is 
related to malware and software attacks.  There is little written with respect the hardware 
itself, which may be the largest vulnerability.  As explained above, the concept of cyber 
security as it relates to hardware is almost non-existent.  There are many hardware 
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vectors that can be exploited to produce vulnerabilities. The security phenomenon for 
hardware has only recently begun to be exposed and documented.  Most of the literature 
describes a potential risk or outlines some possible threats, but specific documented 
incidents there is little information available.   
There has been a great deal of interest, study, and reporting on hardware and 
recently the security implications.  While there is a well-developed understanding on the 
topic, our understanding of current vulnerability for homeland security would be 
improved by further research on what the vulnerabilities are and how we can mitigate that 
threat.  Identifying how we can prevent these issues or at least understand them will allow 
decision makers and agencies involved to learn more about this important topic.  The 
DoD has recognized the potential significance of this issue and initiated a supply chain 
risk management (SCRM) policy to address the vulnerabilities, with an implementation 
target date of FY2016.168 However, in the same breath, they say: 
…outdated constructs of a static or stale industrial base, where the U.S. 
government could dictate certain assurances or impose inflexible rules on our suppliers, 
must give way to the facts on the ground that our base is no longer a single monolithic 
entity. Any industrial base supply chain policy must take these facts into account.”169   
This statement almost negates any action to address the supply chain issue.  This 
is the only actual strategy that has been targeted for implementation amongst all of the 
many that have been offered in the multitude of reports on these issues.  It is therefore 
recommended that the suggestions proposed in the 2005 High Performance Microchip 
Supply report coupled with the suggestions in the newer 2010 Security Risk Management 
for the Off-the Shelf (OTS) Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Supply 
Chain report be implemented to create an overarching microchip supply chain policy.  
This will afford the best possible solution to combat the vulnerabilities in the microchip 
supply chain.  This will also allow collaboration within the DHS as well as between other 
                                                 
168 Krekel, Adams and Bakos, Occupying the Information High Ground. 
169 Sternsetin, “Defense Rejects Rigid Supply Chain Security Countermeasures.” 
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agencies and nations. With the latest in technological advances, it will not only optimize 
the ability of our personnel, but also enhance the overall effectiveness of the government.   
I would like to close with the thought that the issues surrounding cyber security 
are similar in nature to those we in police work face routinely.  Conventional crimes, 
such as robbery or burglary occur routinely and have never been eliminated despite 
employing a myriad of strategies such as alarm systems and locks or even deterrence via 
laws and penalties.  Instead policing service and investigations have to be provided to 
arrest the perpetrators and take them off the street.  This is what impacts criminals and 
brings down the crime rate.  What we have already addressed in policing though is the 
defined boundaries or jurisdictions.  The defining of boundaries will prove to be the key 
to successful cyber security.  If not, then we may face a “cyber Pearl Harbor” as 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned.170  Or as General Keith B. Alexander, 
commander of .U.S Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency 
(NSA) succinctly said, the U.S. is facing '“death by a thousand cuts” in cyberspace.171  
 
  
                                                 
170 Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack on U.S.,” 
New York Times, October 11, 2012. 
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APPENDIX A. SIGNIFICANT CYBER INCIDENTS SINCE 2006 
AS PER THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
STUDIES172  
This list is a work in progress that we update as new incidents come to light. If 
you have suggestions for additions, send them to techpolicy@csis.org. Significance is in 
the eye of the beholder, but we focus on successful attacks on government agencies, 
defense and high tech companies, or economic crimes with losses of more than a million 
dollars.  
1. May 2006. The Department of State’s networks were hacked, and unknown 
foreign intruders downloaded terabytes of information. If Chinese or Russian spies 
backed a truck up to the State Department, smashed the glass doors, tied up the guards, 
and spend the night carting off file cabinets it would be an act of war, but when it 
happens in cyberspace we barely notice.  
2. August 2006. A senior Air Force Officer stated publicly, “China has 
downloaded 10 to 20 terabytes of data from the NIPRNet (the unclassified military 
network).”  
3. November 2006. Hackers attempted to penetrate U.S. military War College 
networks, resulting in a two week shutdown at one institution while infected machines 
are restored.  
4. December 2006. NASA was forced to block emails with attachments before 
shuttle launches out of fear that they would be hacked. Business Week reported that the 
plans for the latest U.S. space launch vehicles were obtained by unknown foreign 
intruders.  
5. 2006. Chinese hackers were thought to be responsible for shutting down the 
House of Commons computer system.  
6. April 2007. The Department of Commerce had to take the Bureau of Industrial 
Security’s networks offline for several months because its networks were hacked by 
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unknown foreign intruders. This Commerce Bureau reviews confidential information on 
high tech exports.  
7. May 2007. The National Defense University had to take its email systems 
offline because of hacks by unknown foreign intruders that left spyware on the system.  
8. May 2007. Estonian government networks were harassed by a denial of service 
attack by unknown foreign intruders, most likely at the behest of the Russian 
government. Some government online services were temporarily disrupted and online 
banking was halted. These were more like cyber riots than crippling attacks, and the 
Estonians responded very well; however, the attacks created a wave of fear in cyber 
dependent countries like the U.S.  
9. June 2007. The Secretary of Defense’s unclassified email account was hacked 
by unknown foreign intruders as part of a larger series of attacks to access and exploit 
DoD networks.  
10. August 2007. The British Security Service, the French Prime Minister’s 
Office, and the Office of German Chancellor Angela Merkel all complained to China 
about intrusion on their government networks. Merkel even raised the matter with 
China’s President.  
11. September 2007. Israel disrupted Syrian air defense networks (with some 
collateral Damage to its own domestic networks) during the bombing of an alleged 
Syrian nuclear facility.  
12. September 2007. Francis Delon, Secretary-General of National Defence in 
France, stated that information systems in France had been infiltrated by groups from 
China.  
13. September 2007. Contractors employed by DHS and DoD had their networks 
hacked as backdoors into agency systems.  
14. September 2007. British authorities reported that hackers, believed to have 
come from China’s People’s Liberation Army, penetrated the network of the Foreign 
Office and other key departments.  
 57
15. October 2007. China’s Ministry of State Security said that foreign hackers, 42 
percent from Taiwan and 25 percent from United Sates, had been stealing information 
from Chinese key areas. In 2006, when China’s China Aerospace Science & Industry 
Corporation (CASIC) Intranet Network was surveyed, spywares were found in the 
computers of classified departments and corporate leaders.  
16. October 2007. More than a thousand staffers at Oak Ridge National Labs 
received an email with an attachment that, when opened, provides unknown outsiders 
with access to the lab’s databases.  
17. November 2007. Jonathan Evans, the head of Britain’s Security Service 
(MI5), warned 300 business firms of the increased online threat from Russian and 
Chinese state organizations saying, “A number of countries continue to devote 
considerable time and energy trying to steal our sensitive technology on civilian and 
military projects, and trying to obtain political and economic intelligence at our expense. 
They…increasingly deploy sophisticated technical attacks, using the internet to penetrate 
computer networks.”  
18. January 2008. A CIA official said the agency knew of four incidents overseas 
where hackers were able to disrupt, or threaten to disrupt, the power supply for four 
foreign cities.  
19. March 2008. South Korean Officials claimed that China had attempted to 
hack into Korean Embassy and Korea military networks.  
20. March 2008. U.S. officials reported that American, European, and Japanese 
companies were experiencing significant losses of intellectual property and business 
information to criminal and industrial espionage in cyberspace; however, details cannot 
be provided in an unclassified setting.  
21. April – October 2008. A State Department cable made public by WikiLeaks 
reported that hackers successfully stole “50 megabytes of email messages and attached 
documents, as well as a complete list of usernames and passwords from an unspecified 
(U.S. government) agency.” The cable said that at least some of the attacks originated 
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from a Shanghai-based hacker group linked to the People’s Liberation Army’s Third 
Department.  
22. May 2008. The Times of India reported that an Indian official accused China 
of hacking into government computers. The official stated that the core of the Chinese 
assault is the scanning and mapping of India’s official networks to gain access to content 
in order to plan how to disable or disrupt networks during a conflict.  
23. June 2008. The networks of several Congressional offices were hacked by 
unknown foreign intruders. Some infiltrations involved offices with an interest in human 
rights in Tibet.  
24. Summer 2008. The databases of both Republican and Democratic presidential 
campaigns were hacked and downloaded by unknown foreign intruders.  
25. Summer 2008. Marathon Oil, ExxonMobil, and ConocoPhillips were hacked 
and lost data detailing the quantity, value, and location of oil discoveries around the 
world. One company put the losses in the millions.  
26. August 2008. Computer networks in Georgia were hacked by unknown 
foreign intruders, most likely at the behest of the Russian government. Much press 
attention was given to annoying graffiti on Georgian government Websites. There was 
little or no disruption of services but the hacks did put political pressure on the Georgian 
government and were coordinated with Russian military actions.  
27. October 2008. Police discovered a highly sophisticated supply chain attack 
where credit card readers made in China and used in UK supermarkets had a wireless 
device inserted in them. The device copies a credit card when it is inserted, stores the 
data, and transfers the data it has collected once a day via WiFi connection to Lahore, 
Pakistan. Estimated loss is $50 million or more. The device could be instructed to collect 
only certain kinds of cards (such as gold cards), or to go dormant to evade detection.  
28. November 2008. Hackers breached networks at Royal Bank of Scotland’s 
WorldPay, allowing them to clone 100 ATM cards and withdraw over $9 million dollars 
from machines in 49 cities.  
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29. November 2008. Classified networks at DoD and CENTCOM were hacked by 
unknown foreign intruders. Even worse, it took several days to dislodge the intruders and 
re-secure the networks.  
30. December 2008. Retail giant TJX was hacked. The one hacker captured and 
convicted (Maksym Yastremskiy) is said to have made $11 million from the hack.  
31. December 2008. Even tiny CSIS was hacked in December by unknown 
foreign intruders. They probably assumed that some CSIS staff would go into the new 
administration and may have though it might be interesting to read their emails 
beforehand.  
32. 2008. Britain’s MPs were warned about e-mails apparently sent by the 
European Parliament amid fears that they could be used by Chinese hackers to implant 
viruses.  
33. January 2009. Hackers attacked Israel’s internet infrastructure during the 
January 2009 military offensive in the Gaza Strip. The attack, which focused on 
government Websites, was executed by at least 5,000,000 computers. Israeli officials 
believed the attack was carried out by a criminal organization from the former Soviet 
Union, and paid for by Hamas or Hezbollah.  
34. January 2009. Indian Home Ministry officials warned that Pakistani hackers 
had placed malware on popular music download sites used by Indians in preparation for 
cyber attacks.  
35. February 2009. FAA computer systems were hacked. Increased use by FAA 
of IP-bases’ networks also increases the risk of the intentional disruption of commercial 
air traffic.  
36. February 2009. 600 computers at India’s Ministry of External Affairs were 
hacked.  
37. February 2009. French naval aircraft planes were grounded after military 
databases were infected with the “confickr” virus. Naval officials suspected someone at 
the Navy had used an infected USB key.  
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38. March 2009. The German government warned that hackers were offering a 
free version of the new Microsoft operating system that installs Trojans.  
39. March 2009. Canadian researchers found a computer espionage system that 
they believe China implanted on the government networks of 103 countries.  
40. March 2009. Reports in the press say that the plans for Marine Corps 1, the 
new presidential helicopter, were found on a file-sharing network in Iran.  
41. April 2009. Wall Street Journal articles laid out the increasing vulnerability of 
the U.S. power grid to cyber attack also highlighted was the intrusions into F-35 
databases by unknown foreign intruders.  
42. April 2009. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced that hacker from Taiwan 
accessed a Chinese State Council computer containing drafts of his report to the National 
People’s Congress.  
43. April 2009. Chinese hackers reportedly infiltrated South Korea’s Finance 
Ministry via a virus attached to e-mails claiming to be from trusted individuals.  
44. May 2009. In May 2009, Merrick Bank, a leading issuer of credit cards, 
claimed it lost $16 million after hackers compromised as many as 40 million credit card 
accounts.  
45. May 2009. The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) was hacked 
by unknown intruders. The hackers gained access to the data by getting into the HSIN 
account of a federal employee or contractor. The bulk of the data obtained was federal, 
but some state information was also accessed  
46. June 2009. The John Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory, 
which does classified research for the Department of Defense and NASA, took its 
unclassified networks offline after they were penetrated.  
47. June 2009. German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble noted, when 
presenting the Interior Ministry's 2008 security report, that China and Russia were 
increasing espionage efforts and Internet attacks on German companies.  
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48. July 2009. Cyberattacks against Websites in the United States and South 
Korea, including a number of government Websites, were launched by unknown hackers. 
South Korea accused North Korea of being behind the attacks The denial of service 
attacks did not severely disrupt services but lasted for a number of days and generated a 
great deal of media attention.  
49. August 2009. Albert Gonzalez was indicted on charges that between 2006 and 
2008, he and unidentified Russian or Ukrainian colleagues allegedly stole more than 130 
million credit and debit cards by hacking into the computer systems of five major 
companies. This was the largest hacking and identity theft crime in U.S. history.  
50. August 2009. Ehud Tenenbaum was convicted of stealing $10 million from 
U.S. banks. Tenenbaum was known for hacking into DoD computers in 1998, which 
resulted in a sentence of six months of community service from an Israeli court.  
51. November 2009. Jean-Pascal van Ypersele, the vice-chairman of the United 
Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ascribed the hacking and release 
of thousands of emails from the University of East Anglia's Climatic Research Unit to 
Russia as part of a plot to undermine the Copenhagen climate talks.  
52. December 2009. The Wall Street Journal reported that a major U.S. bank had 
been is hacked, losing tens of millions of dollars.  
53. December 2009. Downlinks from U.S military UAV’s were hacked by Iraqi 
insurgents using laptops and $24.99 file sharing software, allowing them to see what the 
UAV has viewed.  
54. January 2010. The UK’s MI5 Security Service warned that undercover 
intelligence officers from the People’s Liberation Army and the Ministry of Public 
Security have approached UK businessmen at trade fairs and exhibitions with the offer of 
“gifts” - cameras and memory sticks - which contain malware that provides the Chinese 
with remote access to users’ computers.  
55. January 2010. Google announced that a sophisticated attack had penetrated 
its networks, along with the networks of more than 30 other U.S. companies. The goal of 
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the penetrations, which Google ascribed to China, was to collect technology, gain access 
to activist Gmail accounts and to Google’s Gaea password management system.  
56. January 2010. Global financial services firm Morgan Stanley experienced a 
“very sensitive” break-in to its network by the same China-based hackers who attacked 
Google Inc.’s computers in December 2009, according to leaked e-mails from a cyber-
security company working for the bank.  
57. January 2010. M. K. Narayanan, India’s National Security Adviser, said his 
office and other government departments were attacked by China on December 15. The 
Prime Minister’s office later denied that their computers had been hacked. Narayanan 
said this was not the first attempt to penetrate Indian government computers.  
58. January 2010. A group named the “Iranian Cyber Army” disrupted service of 
the popular Chinese search engine Baidu. Users were redirected to a page showing an 
Iranian political message. Previously, the “Iranian Cyber Army” had hacked into Twitter 
in December and with a similar message.  
59. January 2010. Intel disclosed that it has experienced a cyber attack at about 
the same time that Google, Adobe, and other were attacked. The hackers exploited the 
vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer software that had been used in the other attacks as 
well. Intel said that there was no intellectual property or financial loss.  
60. March 2010. NATO and the EU warned that the number of cyber attacks 
against their networks had increased significantly over the past 12 months, with Russia 
and China among the most active adversaries.  
61. March 2010. Google announced that it had found malware targeted at 
Vietnamese computer users. Google said that the malware was not especially 
sophisticated and was used to spy on “potentially tens of thousands of users who 
downloaded Vietnamese keyboard language software” the malware also launched 
distributed denial of service attacks against blogs containing political dissent, 
specifically, opposition to bauxite mining efforts in Vietnam.  
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62. March 2010. Australian authorities said there were more than 200 attempts to 
hack into the networks of the legal defense team for Rio Tinto executives being tried in 
China, to gain inside information on the trial defense strategy.  
63. March 2010. Unknown hackers post the real incomes of Latvian government 
officials after accessing their tax records, creating political turmoil.  
64. April 2010. Chinese hackers reportedly broke into classified files at the Indian 
Defence Ministry and Indian embassies around the world, gaining access to Indian 
missile and armament systems.  
65. April 2010. A Chinese telecommunications firm accidently transmitted 
erroneous routing information for roughly 37,000 networks, causing internet traffic to be 
misrouted through China. The incident lasted 20 minutes and exposed traffic from more 
than 8,000 U.S. networks, 8,500 Chinese networks, 1,100 Australian networks, and 230 
French networks.  
66. May 2010. A leaked memo from the Canadian Security and Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) says “Compromises of computer and combinations networks of the 
Government of Canada, Canadian universities, private companies and individual 
customer networks have increased substantially.... In addition to being virtually 
unattributable, these remotely operated attacks offer a productive, secure and low-risk 
means to conduct espionage.”  
67. July 2010. A Russian intelligence agent (allegedly named Alexey 
Karetnikov), was arrested and deported after working for nine months as a software tester 
at Microsoft.  
68. October 2010. Stuxnet, a complex piece of malware designed to interfere with 
Siemens Industrial Control Systems, was discovered in Iran, Indonesia, and elsewhere, 
leading to speculation that it was a government cyber weapon aimed at the Iranian 
nuclear program.  
69. October 2010. The Wall Street Journal reported that hackers using “Zeus” 
malware, available in cybercrime black markets for about $1200, were able to steal over 
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$12 million from five banks in the U.S. and UK. Zeus uses links in emails to steal 
account information, which the hackers then use to transfer money into bank accounts 
they control. 100 “mules”, or low end criminals, were arrested for opening bank accounts 
under false names into which the hackers transferred stolen money.  
70. October 2010. Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate reported a huge 
increase in cyberattacks on the military. Australia’s Defence Minister, John Faulkner, 
revealed there had been 2400 “electronic security incidents” on Defence networks in 
2009 and 5551 incidents between January and August 2010.  
71. December 2010. British Foreign Minister William Hague reported attacks by 
a foreign power on the Foreign Ministry, a defence contractor and other “British 
interests” that evaded defenses by pretending to come from the White House.  
72. December 2010. India’s Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) Website 
(cbi.nic.in) was hacked and data erased. India blames Pakistani hackers. Sensitive CBI 
data, stored on computer not easily accessible from the Internet, was unaffected.  
73. January 2011. Hackers penetrated the European Union's carbon trading 
market, which allows organizations to buy and sell their carbon emissions quotas, and 
stole more than $7 million in credits, forcing the market to shut down temporarily.  
74. January 2011. Hacker extracted $6.7 million from South Africa's Postbank 
over the New Year's Holiday.  
75. January 2011. The Canadian government reported a major cyber attack 
against its agencies, including Defence Research and Development Canada, a research 
agency for Canada's Department of National Defence. The attack forced the Finance 
Department and Treasury Board, Canada’s main economic agencies, to disconnect from 
the internet. Canadian sources attribute the attack to China.  
76. March 2011. Hackers penetrated French government computer networks in 
search of sensitive information on upcoming G-20 meetings.  
77. March-April 2011. Between March 2010 and April 2011, the FBI identified 
20 incidents in which the online banking credentials of small-to-medium sized U.S. 
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businesses were compromised and used to initiate wire transfers to Chinese economic and 
trade companies. As of April 2011, the total attempted fraud amounts to approximately 
$20 million; the actual victim losses are $11 million.  
78. March-April 2011. Hackers used phishing techniques in attempt to obtain 
data that would compromise RSA’s SecureID authentication technology. The data 
acquired was then used in an attempt to penetrate Lockheed Martin’s networks.  
79. April 2011. Google reported a phishing effort to compromise hundreds of 
Gmail passwords for accounts of prominent people, including senior U.S. officials. 
Google attributes the effort to China.  
80. April 2011. Employees at Oak Ridge National Laboratory received bogus 
emails with malware attachments. Two machines were infected and “a few megabytes” 
of data were extracted before the lab was able to cut its internet connection. Oak Ridge 
was the target of an intrusion in 2007.  
81. May 2011. Cybercriminals masquerading as member of the hacktivist group 
“Anonymous” penetrated the PlayStation network. Sony estimated that personal 
information for more than 80 million users was compromised and that the cost of the 
breach at over $170 million.  
82. June 2011. The IMF’s networks were compromised reportedly by a foreign 
government using fraudulent emails with malware attachments, and a “large quantity of 
data, including documents and e-mails,” are exfiltrated.  
83. June 2011. Citibank reported that credit card data for 360,000 of its customers 
were exfiltrated using a relatively simple manipulation of URLs.  
84. July 2011. In a speech unveiling the Department of Defense’s cyber strategy, 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense mentioned that a defense contractor was hacked and 
24,000 files from the DOD were stolen.  
85. July 2011. The German Bundespolizei (Federal Police) and the 
Bundeszollverwaltung (Federal Customs Service) discovered that servers used to locate 
serious criminals and terrorism suspects by gathering information from GPS systems in 
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cars and mobile phones were penetrated (using a phishing attack)as early as 2010. 
Following the cyberattack, the relevant servers had to be temporarily shut down to 
prevent further data losses.  
86. July 2011. South Korea said hackers from China had penetrated an internet 
portal and accessed phone numbers, e-mail addresses, names, and other data for 35 
million Koreans.  
87. August 2011. According to sources in the Japanese government, Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries and 20 other Japanese defense and high tech firms were the target of an 
effort to extract classified defense information. Japanese officials believed the exploits all 
originated from the same source. The intruder used email with a malicious attachment 
whose contents were the same as a legitimate message sent 10 hours earlier.  
88. August 2011. Email and documents from 480 members of the Japanese Diet 
and lawmakers and their staff were compromised for a month after a phishing attack 
implanted a Trojan on members’ computers and Diet servers. The hijacked machines 
communicated with a server in China and the attackers included Chinese characters in 
their code.  
89. September 2011. Unknown attackers hacked a Dutch certificate authority, 
allowing them to issue more than 500 fraudulent certificates for major companies and 
government agencies. The certificates are used to verify that a Website is genuine. By 
issuing a false certificate, an attacker can pretend to be a secure Website, intercept e-mail, 
or install malicious software. This was the second hack of a certificate authority in 2011.  
90. September 2011. Australia’s Defense Signals Directorate says that defense 
networks are attacked more than 30 times a day, with the number of attacks increasing by 
more than 350 percent by 2009.  
91. September 2011. A computer virus from an unknown source introduced 
“keylogger” malware onto ground control stations for U.S. Air Force UAVs and, 
according to press reports, infected both classified and unclassified networks at Creech 
Air Force Base in Nevada. The U.S. did not lose control of any drone nor does it appear 
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that any data was exfiltrated, but the malware was persistent and took several attempts to 
remove.  
92. October 2011. Networks of 48 companies in the chemical, defense, and other 
industries were penetrated for at least six months by a hacker looking for intellectual 
property. Symantec attributes some of the attacks to computers in Hebei, China.  
93. November 2011. Norway’s National Security Agency (NSM) reports that at 
least 10 major Norwegian defense and energy companies were hacked. The attacks were 
specifically "tailored" for each company, using an email phishing scheme. NSM said that 
the attacks came when the companies, mainly in the oil and gas sectors, have been 
involved in large-scale contract negotiations. The hacking occurred over the course of 
2011, with hackers gaining access to confidential documents, industrial data, usernames 
and passwords.  
94. December 2011. U.S. Chamber of Commerce computer networks were 
completely penetrated for more than a year by hackers who, according to press reports, 
had ties to the People Liberation Army. The hackers had access to access to everything in 
Chamber computers, including member company communications and industry positions 
on U.S. trade policy.  
95. March 2012. NASA’s Inspector General reported that 13 APT attacks 
successfully compromised NASA computers in 2011. In one attack, intruders stole 150 
user credentials that could be used to gain unauthorized access to NASA systems. 
Another attack at the Joint Propulsion Laboratory involving China-based IP let the 
intruders gain full access to key JPL systems and sensitive user accounts.  
96. March 2012. The BBC reported a “sophisticated cyber-attack” in an effort to 
disrupt the BBC Persian Language Service. The attack coincided with efforts to jam two 
BBC satellite feeds to Iran. The BBC’s Director General blamed Iran for the incident.  
97. March 2012. India’s Minister for Communications and Information 
Technology revealed in a written reply to a Parliamentary question that 112 government 
Websites had been compromised from December 2011 to February 2012. Most of the 
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incidents involved Website defacement and many of the hacks appeared to originate in 
Pakistan.  
98. March 2012. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued amber alerts 
warning of a cyber intrusion campaign on U.S. gas pipelines, dating back to December 
2011. Press reports indicated that Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response 
Team (ICS-CERT) described the attack as a sophisticated spear phishing campaign 
emanating from a single source.  
99. May 2012. UK officials told the press that there had been a small number of 
successful perpetrations of classified MOD networks.  
100. May 2012. An espionage toolkit named “Flame” is discovered in computers 
in the Iranian Oil Ministry, as well as in other Middle Eastern countries, including Israel, 
Syria, and Sudan, and other nations around the world.  
101. May 2012. Researchers at the University of Toronto report that versions of 
the installer for the proxy tool Simurgh, which anonymizes net use and is popular in 
countries such as Iran and Syria to circumvent government internet controls, also installs 
a keylogger Trojan which sends the user name, keystrokes, and program use to another 
site.  
102. June 2012. A phishing campaign targets the U.S. aerospace industry experts 
attending the 2013 IEEE Aerospace Conference.  
103. June 2012. A global fraud campaign using automated versions of SpyEye 
and Zeus Trojans targeted high-value personal and corporate accounts and bypassed two-
factor authentication.  
104. June 2012. The head of the UK Security Service stated that a London-listed 
company lost an estimated £800m ($1.2 billion) as a result of state cyber attacks.  
105. July 2012. A Trojan nicknamed “Mahdi” found gathering data from 
approximately 800 critical infrastructure engineering firms, government agencies, 
financial houses, and academia throughout the Middle East and beyond, predominantly in 
Israel and Iran. The virus contains Persian language strings.  
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106. July 2012. Indian naval officials confirmed that a virus had collected data 
from sensitive computer systems at the country’s Eastern Naval Command headquarters 
and sent the data to Chinese IP addresses. The virus allegedly entered the Navy’s network 
via infected USB drives, which were used to transfer data from standalone computers 
holding sensitive files to networked systems.  
107. July 2012. The Director of the National Security Agency said that there had 
been a 17-fold increase in cyber incident at American infrastructure companies between 
2009 and 2011.  
108. August 2012. Malware nicknamed “Gauss,” infected 2,500 systems 
worldwide. Gauss appears to have been aimed at Lebanese banks, and contains code 
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APPENDIX B. GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Authorization—A right or a permission that is granted to a system entity to access 
a system resource. 
Backdoor—A hidden method for bypassing normal computer authentication. 
BIOS—Basic Input/Output System or Basic Integrated Operating System. BIOS 
refers to the software code run by a computer when first powered on. The primary 
function of BIOS is to prepare the machine so other software programs stored on various 
media (such as hard drives, floppies, and CDs) can load, execute, and assume control of 
the computer. This process is known as booting up. 
Control System (CS)—An interconnection of components (computers, sensors, 
actuators, communication pathways, etc.) connected or related in such a manner to 
command, direct, or regulate itself or another system, such as chemical process plant 
equipment/system, oil refinery equipment/systems, electric generation/ 
Encryption—In cryptography, encryption is the process of obscuring information 
to make it unreadable without special knowledge. 
Firmware—Software that is embedded in a hardware device. It is often provided 
on flash ROMs or as a binary image file that can be uploaded onto existing hardware by a 
user. 
Malware—Malicious software designed to infiltrate or damage a computer 
system, without the owner’s consent. Malware is commonly taken to include computer 
viruses, worms, Trojan horses, Root kits, spyware, and adware. 
Network Device—A computer connected to a network providing services to 
and/or using services from other network devices. Also called a network node. 
Packet—A structured and defined part of a message transmitted over a network. 
Patch—A fix for a software program where the actual binary executable and 
related files are modified. 
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Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)—A programmable microprocessor-based 
device designed to control and monitor various inputs and outputs used to automate 
industrial processes. 
Port—Hardware Port: An outlet on a piece of equipment into which a plug or 
cable connects. Network port: An interface for communicating with a computer program 
over a network. I/O or machine port - port-mapped I/O: Nearly all processor families use 
the same assembly instructions for memory access and hardware I/O. Software port: 
Software is sometimes written for specific processors, operating systems, or 
programming interfaces. A software port is software that has been changed to work on 
another system. 
Root kits—Sets of programs that are introduced into a computer system without 
permission of the computer operator to obtain privileged access, which would allow 
control of the computer, usually with capabilities to avoid detection. 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)—A SCADA computer 
system is developed for gathering and analyzing real time data. SCADA systems are used 
to monitor and control a plant or equipment in industries such as telecommunications, 
water and waste control, energy, oil and gas refining, and transportation. 
Server—A computer or device on a network that manages network resources. For 
example, a file server is a computer and storage device dedicated to storing files, a Web 
server for access to Web content, a DNS server for domain name services, a database 
server for access to relational tables, an e-mail server for access to e-mail, etc. 
Services—Software application that facilitates communications to other 
applications or devices either local or distributed. Services are typically associated to a 
port. Sometimes services are referred to as software ports. 
Upgrade—Generally, an upgrade is a new release of software, hardware, and/or 
firmware replacing the original components to fix errors and/or vulnerabilities in 
software and/or provide additional functionality and/or improve performance. 
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Validate—To give evidence for or establish the soundness of. Validation is a 
process of checking documents or testing against a formal standard. 
Virus—Software used to infect a computer. After the virus code is written, it is 
buried within an existing program. Once that program is executed, the virus code is 
activated and attaches copies of itself to other programs in the system. Infected programs 
copy the virus to other programs. See Malware. 
Worm—A computer worm is a self-replicating computer program similar to a 
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